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22 abstract
There have been significant changes in both the fertility rates and fertility percep­
tion since 1970s. In this paper, we examine the relationship between government 
policies towards fertility and the fertility trends. Total fertility rate, defined as the 
number of children per woman, is used as the main fertility trend variable. We use 
panel data from the United Nations World Population Policies database, and the 
World Bank World Development Indicators for the period 1976 through 2013. We 
find a significant negative association between a country’s fertility rate and its 
anti­fertility policy. On the other hand, there is no significant and robust relation­
ship between the fertility rate and a country’s pro­fertility or family­planning 
policies. In addition we find evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the total fertil­
ity rate, and spatial spillovers from a government’s policy on fertility. 
Keywords: fertility rate, population, government policies
1 IntRoDUctIon
Fertility rates have decreased substantially over the last few decades. While 
decreases are more profound in developed countries, developing countries have 
also experienced significant changes following, in some cases, specific govern-
ment policies. While population control policies vary widely around the world, 
governments in developing countries tend to have a relatively negative view 
towards fertility, which often leads to the adoption of anti-fertility policies. It is 
not clear, however, whether there is indeed a significant or strong relationship 
between population policies and fertility rates.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between government policies towards 
fertility and the change in the total fertility rate using panel data on 133 countries 
over the 1976-2013 period. We use country-level data from the United Nations 
World Population Policies Database, and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.1 In our analysis we consider different types of government policy. The 
first is to reduce fertility through education, health care, family planning, employ-
ment programs and the availability of low-cost contraception. We can refer to this 
as anti-fertility policy. The second is to raise fertility through a variety of govern-
ment subsidies for childcare and housing, tax incentives, maternal and paternal 
leave and media campaigns. We can refer to this as pro-fertility policy.2 In addi-
tion, within the anti-fertility policy category, we examine family planning policy 
separately to see if that policy is particularly strongly related to changes in fertility. 
We also control for country fixed effects and spatial autocorrelation in the data. 
We present results for different econometric specifications to understand the 
robustness of our results. Our main findings show a statistically significant, nega-
tive relationship between change in total fertility rate and anti-fertility policy. On 
1 The UN World Population Policies Database provides data for the years 1976, 1986, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013. Data for 2015 became available very recently but was excluded from our analy-
sis due to lack of data for that year for other variables used in our regressions.
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23the other hand, there is no significant and robust relationship between change in 
total fertility rate and pro-fertility policy. We also do not find a significant and 
robust relationship with family planning policy. In addition we find evidence of 
spatial autocorrelation in the total fertility rate, and spatial spillovers from a gov-
ernment’s policy on fertility.
In the next section, we start with a brief discussion of the previous literature and 
then present trends in the total fertility rate and government policies towards 
fertility. This is followed by a description of the empirical approach, models and 
variables used in our analysis. We present our results in section 4 and provide a 
summary and concluding remarks in the last section.
2 feRtIlIty tRenDs anD PoPUlatIon contRol PolIcIes 
Other studies that examined whether fertility responds to population policies have 
had mixed results. Pritchett (1994) argues and shows that the significant variation 
in fertility rates across countries is due to the desired fertility of couples, and is not 
driven by the availability of contraceptives or family planning policy by govern-
ments. At the same time, Haub (2010) argues that population control policy in 
South Korea not only worked but worked too well. South Korea now has one of 
the lowest fertility rates in the world. Singapore is another example where the 
population policy went from anti-natalist in 1960s and 1970s to pro-natalist after 
the mid-1980s (Yap, 2003). Yap (2003) notes that the total fertility rate in Singa-
pore rose sharply from 1.6 to about 2 children per woman in 1988, soon after the 
introduction of the new pro-natalist policy in 1987. Feyrer, Sacerdote and Stern 
(2008) argue that there may be an increase in the fertility rates in high-income 
countries due to increased participation of males in the household, which is not 
necessarily driven by a specific government policy. A recent book by Takayama 
and Werding (2011) provides an overview of policy responses to low fertility with 
a particular focus on China, France, Japan, South Korea and Sweden. While there 
is no consensus on whether there are policies that have clearly worked to raise 
fertility rates, public involvement may be justified or required in some cases. 
Studies in the volume also point to difficulties with the available data and the 
complexity of studying fertility behavior. For example, Bradshaw and Attar-
Schwartz (2011) examine the relationship between fertility and social policy using 
the European Social Survey data on sixteen European countries. They point to 
several problems, particularly with the measurement of social policy variables and 
do not find strong evidence of a relationship between social policy and fertility.
There have been significant decreases in fertility rates in recent decades. Figures 
1 and 2 show the variation in total fertility rates in 1976 and 2013, respectively. 
Figure 1 shows very high fertility rates (over 5 children per woman) in 90 coun-
tries in 1976. Africa and the Middle East had the highest concentration of coun-
tries with very high fertility rates. Only 23 countries in Europe and North America 
had below replacement fertility. Figure 2 shows drastic changes in fertility. In 
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24 number of countries with below replacement fertility increased to 73. While the 
highest concentration of countries with very high fertility is still in Africa, none of 
the Middle Eastern countries had very high fertility. Many African countries expe-
rienced significant decreases in fertility. Unlike what we observed in the map for 
1976, all other European countries (particularly Eastern European countries), and 
some emerging market economies such as Brazil, China and Turkey also moved 
to below replacement fertility in 2013.
Figure 1
Total fertility rate in 1976 
 Missing data (91)  0.00-2.09 (23)  2.1-3.5 (38)  3.51-5.00 (23)  5.01+ (90)
Source: United Nations Population Policies Database, 1976.
Figure 2 
Total fertility rate in 2013
 Missing data (90)  0.00-2.09 (73)  2.1-3.5 (56)  3.51-5.00 (31)  5.01+ (15)
Source: United Nations Population Policies Database, 2013.
We now turn to government policies towards fertility. The United Nations World 
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25ment attitudes towards fertility and other important demographic variables.3 
United Nations (2013) notes that the database uses four major sources of informa-
tion. The first is the official response from the country governments to the inquir-
ies directly sent by the United Nations. The second is government documents, 
publications, laws, regulations and proclamations. The third is the official materi-
als provided by international and intergovernmental organizations, including 
other United Nations agencies. The final source is the materials provided by non-
governmental organizations such as media outlets, academic and other research 
institutions.4 
The key variable of interest in this database is the “policy on fertility level.” 
United Nations (2013) describes this variable as “a Government’s stated policy to 
influence the level of fertility in the country”. Response categories for the variable 
are “raise”, “maintain”, “lower”, and “no intervention”. The map in figure 3 shows 
how government policies towards fertility differ for countries in our dataset. In 
1976, only 55 countries had an anti-fertility policy. We see that a number of gov-
ernments in Africa did not have an anti-fertility policy. It is also noteworthy that 
only 18 countries had a pro-fertility policy in 1976.
Figure 3 
Government policy on fertility in 1976 
  Missing data 
(105)
  Raise fertility  
(18)
  No intervention 
(72)
  Maintain 
fertility (15)
  Lower fertility 
(55)
Source: United Nations Population Policies Database, 1976.
While we see a similar pattern in 2013 in figure 4, significantly more governments 
have anti-fertility policies. At the same time, more governments have adopted 
pro-fertility policies from 1976 to 2013. This could be seen as an indication of 
3 See United Nations (2013) and https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/img/Definitions_Policy_Variables.pdf for a 
detailed description of the variables in the database.
4 See United Nations (2013) for more on these data sources. Box I.1 on page 43 in that publication has a chart 
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26 concerns regarding the impact of population aging on economies. 5 Figure 4 shows 
that the number of governments with an anti-fertility policy rose to 76, which is 
significantly greater than the number of governments with such a policy in 1976. 
In addition, most African countries now have policies to reduce fertility. The 
number of governments with pro-fertility policies also increased substantially, to 
51. In figure 5, we also summarize the time trend in the percent share of countries 
with policies to reduce and raise fertility. We see a significant increase in the share 
of countries with policies to reduce fertility between 1986 and 2001 and then a 
sharp increase in the share of countries with policies to raise fertility after 2001.
Figure 4 
Government policy on fertility in 2013 
  Missing data  
(89)
  Raise fertility  
(51)
  No intervention 
(22)
  Maintain 
fertility (27)
  Lower fertility 
(76)
Source: United Nations Population Policies Database, 2013.
Figure 5 












1976 1986 1996 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Anti-fertility policy Pro-fertility policy
Source: United Nations Population Policies Database, 1976­2013.
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27We also see in figures 3 and 4 that the spatial distribution of the government poli-
cies and the total fertility rates are not random. There seems to be a significant 
degree of spatial clustering among countries. The local indicators of spatial asso-
ciation (LISA) map in figure 6 shows that the spatial correlation in total fertility 
rates in 1976 is particularly strong among countries with high fertility rates, espe-
cially so for Africa and the Middle East. The LISA map in figure 7 shows that this 
significant spatial association persisted for countries in Africa. These two maps 
point to the presence of spatial autocorrelation in total fertility rates, which we 
examine in the next section.
Figure 6 
Local indicators of spatial association (LISA Map), total fertility rate in 1976
  Not significant 
(109)
  High-high 
(51)
  Low-low 
(90)
  Low-high 
(2)
  High-low 
(0)
  Neighborless 
(101)
Figure 7 
Local indicators of spatial association (LISA Map), total fertility rate in 2013
  Not significant 
(123)
  High-high 
(39)
  Low-low 
(0)
  Low-high 
(2)
  High-low 
(0)
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28 3 eMPIRIcal aPPRoach anD MethoDoloGy
We examine empirically how fertility responds to government policies towards 
fertility. We use Change in the total fertility rate as the dependent variable. Data 
on total fertility rate come from the United Nations Population Division. The three 
key explanatory variables are anti­fertility policy, pro­fertility policy, and family 
planning policy, which are all constructed from the variables in the United Nations 
World Population Policies database. Anti­fertility policy is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the government has an anti-fertility policy, and 0 otherwise. As 
we explained in section 2, we used the variable “policy on fertility level” from the 
United Nations database and recoded the response category “lower” as 1 and other 
responses (“raise”, “maintain”, and “no intervention”) as 0. 
Pro­fertility policy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the government has 
a pro-fertility policy, and 0 otherwise. For this variable, we used “policy on fertil-
ity level” from the United Nations database again, and this time recoded “raise”, 
and “maintain” as 1 and other responses (“lower” and “no intervention”) as 0.6 
Family planning policy is also a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the gov-
ernment has a policy that supports family planning directly or indirectly, and 0 
otherwise. While family planning is mentioned as part of the definition of “policy 
on fertility level” in the United Nations database, the same database has a separate 
variable called “government support for family planning”. For the variable family 
planning policy, we used “government support for family planning” from the 
United Nations database, and recoded “direct support” and “indirect support” as 1 
and other responses (“no support” and “not permitted”) as 0. Our three explana-
tory variables are related to each other.  Anti­fertility policy is strongly and nega-
tively correlated with pro­fertility policy. Family planning policy is positively 
correlated with anti­fertility policy but the correlation is not very high (about 
0.24). Family planning policy is also negatively correlated with pro­fertility 
policy. We are using these variables in separate regressions, which gives us a way 
to compare results across different regressions.
We also use a number of other control variables that include GDP per capita, 
health spending per capita, trade to GDP, share of urban population, and country 
fixed effects. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear popu-
lation and measured in constant (2005) US dollars. The relationship between GDP 
and the fertility rate can be rather complex. While economic development in a 
country that is measured by GDP per capita can act like a contraceptive, countries 
at a high level of development may engage in promotion of higher fertility.7 Hence 
we do not have a specific expectation regarding the relationship between the fertil-
ity rate and the GDP per capita. Health spending per capita, defined as the ratio of 
6 We coded “maintain fertility” response as 1 since a policy to maintain fertility or to prevent fertility from 
declining would still involve some pro-fertility intervention from the government. We have checked the robust-
ness of our results by coding it as zero and found that our results did not change significantly and qualitatively.
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29the sum of public and private health expenditures to total population, is an impor-
tant variable that controls for a potential impact of the level (and quality) of the 
health care provided to citizens on their fertility behavior. We might expect a 
negative relationship to total fertility rate since couples may likely decide to have 
fewer children if they know that they will receive good healthcare for themselves 
and their kids. Trade to GDP, defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services to GDP, captures vulnerability of economies to external 
shocks. Kim and Prskawetz (2006) argue and show evidence that households use 
children (or fertility) as a consumption smoothing strategy in response to external 
shocks. Hence we would expect a positive relationship between trade to GDP and 
the total fertility rate. We use share of urban population as a control for the level 
of urbanization.
We apply the spatial econometric methods to estimate the relationship between 
the government policies towards fertility and change in the total fertility rate. Fer-
tility behavior in one country could correlate with the fertility rates in adjacent 
countries. A lot of countries in our dataset have relatively open borders with a 
good degree of mobility among countries. For example, people in many African 
countries have ethnic, religious or tribal links with others across the border. This 
could lead to spatial correlation in the fertility behavior. Similarly, government 
policies on fertility could also have spillover effects on adjacent countries. Central 
and regional governments interact with those that are in close proximity, which 
could lead to spatial dependence in fertility policies. There may also be concern 
for spatial dependence if the policy of aid organizations in one country is driven 
by their experience in a neighboring country or region. Other studies have pointed 
to similar spatial or neighborhood effects in developing countries. For example, 
Parent and Zouche (2012) provide evidence that spatial dependence matters for 
growth outcomes in Africa and the Middle East. Easterly and Levine (1998) also 
give evidence of neighborhood effects in growth performance and growth-related 
policies in African countries.
Statistically, we refer to the standard Moran I test statistic to understand the spatial 
correlation in the data. Figure 8 shows the Moran’s I scatter plot of all countries.8 
The Moran I test statistic is equal to 0.295 and is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level, which means the spatial autocorrelation is significant and cannot be ne-
glected in our data. The x-axis is the value of the total fertility rate of each country, 
and the y-axis is the corresponding Moran’s I values for the country with adjacent 
countries. The scatter plot shows that generally with the increase of the fertility 
rate, Moran’s I tends to be positive, and vice versa. Most positive Moran’s I values 
are for African countries, while most negative Moran’s I values are for countries 
in Europe.9 
8 We included a different version of this graph (figure A1) with country codes and a list of countries used in 
the graph in the appendix section.
9 We also conducted more detailed spatial diagnostic tests where we find that spatial autocorrelation is a con-
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30 Figure 8 










We examine spatial dependence by running spatial lag and spatial error regres-
sions. Models of spatial dependence account for influences from places that are 
geographically close to each other. Failing to consider spatial dependence may 
lead to biased, inefficient, or inconsistent coefficient estimates (Cliff and Ord, 
1981; Anselin, 1988). A spatial error model contains an autoregressive process in 
the error term, whereas a spatial lag model assumes a spatially lagged dependent 
variable. The linear spatial lag or spatial autoregressive model (SAR) can be 
expressed as:
       Change in fertility rateit = α0 + ρ W Fertilityrateit + β Xit + γi + τt + εit (1)
where W denotes the spatial weighting matrix that provides the spatial neighbor-
hood information. There are different ways to generate the spatial matrices. Here 
we use the inverse distance matrix10. ρ denotes the spatial parameter. X includes 
the main explanatory and other control variables that are described at the begin-
ning of this section. Finally, each year in the panel data set is controlled for by 
time fixed effects (τ), and γ represents the country fixed effects in the model. The 
spatial error model (SEM) can be expressed as:
       Change in fertility rateit = α0 + β Xit + γi + τt + εit, where εit = β W εit + vit , (2)
10 The inverse distance matrix is generated using the latitude and longitude information for countries: https://
developers.google.com/public-data/docs/canonical/countries_csv. Note that we also ran regressions with a 
contiguity matrix. Results are largely similar but inverse distance weighting allows more observations par-
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31where the error process can be written as a spatially autoregressive process. We 
will be showing results from both the SAR model and SEM, in addition to the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that does not include any spatial correc-
tion in the next section.11
4 eMPIRIcal ResUlts 
In the first set of regressions we are using panel data to examine the relationship 
between a government’s policy on fertility and change in the total fertility rate.12 
In table 1 we see a statistically significant negative association between change in 
the total fertility rate and government’s anti-fertility policy. The results for anti­
fertility policy show that an anti-fertility policy has both a negative direct and a 
negative indirect (or spatial spillover) association with the change in total fertility 
rate, which together lead to a strong negative total effect as indicated in column 
(3). The coefficient estimate for the SAR direct effect in column (1) shows that 
when there is an anti-fertility policy, change in total fertility rate is reduced by 
about 0.021 points. With an average total fertility growth rate of about -0.058 (or 
-5.8%) for the 1976-2013 period, this translates into about 35% of the fertility 
growth rate on average. We see similar but smaller coefficient estimates in the 
SEM and OLS regressions in columns (4) and (5). While we get a consistently 
negative and significant coefficient for anti­fertility policy in all three regression 
specifications, it is important to note that the magnitude of the association with 
change in total fertility rate is substantially greater when direct and indirect (spill-
over) results are combined together in the SAR model results. We also see that 
both spatial parameters (rho and lambda) are positive and statistically significant.
In tables 2 and 3, we do not see any significant relationship between the change in 
total fertility rate and pro­fertility policy or family planning policy. The latter 
result (in table 3) is consistent with the evidence from Pritchett (1994), in which 
evidence suggested the desired fertility of families mattered more than family 
planning policies. 
11 The OLS regression specification is very similar to the one shown in equation 2, with the exception that the 
error term is not subject to the spatially autoregressive process. That specification can be written as Change 
in fertility rateit=α0 + βXit +γi + τt + εit.
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32 Table 1 
Change in total fertility rate and government’s anti­fertility policy
Dependent 




saR saR saR seM ols











































































Observations 798 798 798 798 798
Number of 
countries 133 133 133 133 133
Econometric 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results for the remaining control variables are quite consistent across all three 
regressions. While the coefficients for GDP per capita, trade-to-GDP ratio and 
share of urban population are positive and mostly statistically significant, the 
coefficient for health spending per capita is negative and statistically significant. 
While we find a negative and significant relationship between health spending per 
capita and the change in total fertility rate, it is hard to say whether this is driven 
by the decision of the couples to have fewer children due to better healthcare for 
their kids and themselves. It is also not possible to know with the data we have 
whether the quality of healthcare has improved over time in those countries that 
experienced lower fertility rates. There is also some evidence of a positive and 
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33expect urbanization to have a negative association with change in fertility, it is 
possible that this happens after a certain threshold of urbanization is reached. 
Until that point we may still see an increase in fertility as less developed and less 
urbanized countries go through significant urbanization. Note that all regressions 
also control for time-invariant country fixed effects, which would include institu-
tional differences between countries. It is also noteworthy that, in all three regres-
sions, spatial dependence parameters (rho for the SAR and lambda for the SEM) 
are positive and significant. We have also examined spatial autocorrelation in total 
fertility rate and found a positive and significant Moran’s I parameter, which we 
have already discussed in section 3. Hence, we indeed think spatial autocorrela-
tion is a concern, which we control for in SAR and SEM regressions.
Table 2 
Change in total fertility rate and government’s pro­fertility policy
Dependent 




saR saR saR seM ols












































































Observations 798 798 798 798 798
Number of 
countries 133 133 133 133 133
Econometric 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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34 Table 3
Change in total fertility rate and government’s family planning policy
Dependent 




saR saR saR seM ols













































































Observations 798 798 798 798 798
Number of 
countries 133 133 133 133 133
Econometric 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
While the results in table 1 may make one think that anti-fertility policy has been 
effective in reducing total fertility rate, these results do not necessarily indicate 
causal links. It is possible that government policies are also driven by the total 
fertility rate. As another robustness check, in the next set of regressions, we are 
moving away from the panel data structure and regressing the change in the fertil-
ity rate between 1976 and 2013 on the 1976 value of the policy and other control 
variables. Results for the policy variables in tables 4-6 are quite similar to the ones 
in tables 1-3.13 We still see a negative and statistically significant association 
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35between change in fertility rate and anti-fertility policy in all three regression 
specifications, and there is generally no significant association for other policy 
variables.14 Among the control variables, the only robust and significant relation-
ship is for GDP per capita where the coefficient is positive. Also, the only robust 
and significant spatial parameter is for rho in the spatial lag (SAR) model, where 
the parameter is positive.
Table 4 















































Observations 102 102 102
Wald chi2(4) 40.0463 31.5678
Prob > chi2 0 0
Econometric model SEM SAR OLS
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5







































14 Note that it was not possible to break down the SAR results into direct and indirect components as these 






























































Observations 102 102 102
Wald chi2(4) 27.6384 24.6198
Prob > chi2 0 0.0001
Econometric model SEM SAR OLS
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6 















































Observations 102 102 102
Wald chi2(4) 29.6418 19.8782
Prob > chi2 0 0.0005
Econometric model SEM SAR OLS
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5 sUMMaRy anD conclUDInG ReMaRKs 
In this paper, we find significant negative association between change in the total 
fertility rate and anti-fertility policy. On the other hand, there is no significant 
relationship for the pro-fertility policy or family planning policy, which makes it 
hard to conclude that government policy with respect to fertility works. It is 
possible that pro-fertility policy may not have been as strong (or long-lasting) as 
the anti-fertility policy. It is true that pro-fertility policies have become popular 
more recently. We may not be seeing the full impact of those policies on fertility 
rates empirically yet and can expect more countries to adopt such pro-fertility 
policies in the near future. We also need to consider the possibility of a change in 













































42 (1) 21-43 (2018)
37tries, which is hard to change with a pro-fertility policy. Additionally, as many 
scholars noted before, fertility behavior is quite complex which makes it hard to 
establish causal links between fertility and government policy. We also find evi-
dence of spatial autocorrelation in the total fertility rate, and spatial spillovers 
from government’s policy on fertility. It is noteworthy that there is significant 
spatial autocorrelation with fertility, which may explain the persistence of rela-
tively high fertility in contiguous regions of Africa. 
This study can be extended in a number of ways. Particularly, we find the data 
from the United Nations World Population Policies database to be quite rich. The 
dataset would allow one to examine government policies on other demographic 
variables such as population growth, population mobility and population aging, 
among others. At the same time, we should also caution that the database does not 
provide information specifically on the scope of government policies and data are 
not available annually. With this database, it is not possible to distinguish coun-
tries that pursue anti-fertility or pro-fertility policy more strongly than others. 
Having a policy may not be enough to impact fertility behavior, especially when 
the policy is seen as a relatively minor intervention by the government. One 
should also keep in mind that we had to drop a number of countries from our 
analysis due to lack of data in some regression specifications. We include a list of 
those countries in the appendix (see tables A1-A3 for a list of countries used in our 
regressions). This study can be followed by a micro study on a country or a group 
of countries, which may have more detailed information on individual or house-
hold characteristics. 
Disclosure statement 










































































































































list of countries and codes in the Moran’s I graph
africa code africa code oceania code northern 
america
code
Algeria 2 Mauritania 75 Australia 6 Canada 17
Angola 4 Mauritius 74 Fiji 45 United States 124
Benin 13 Morocco 73 Kiribati 64
Botswana 105 Mozambique 80 New Zealand 91
Burkina Faso 125 Niger 82 Samoa 130
Burundi 22 Nigeria 86 Tonga 116
Cabo Verde 33 Rwanda 101 Vanuatu 85




31 Sierra Leone 107
Chad 27 Somalia 109
Comoros 28 South Africa 103
Congo,  
Dem. Rep. 21 Swaziland 131
Congo, Rep. 20 Tanzania 120
Cote d’Ivoire 60 Togo 117
Egypt,  
Arab Rep. 38 Tunisia 118
Equatorial 
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39list of countries and codes in the Moran’s I graph
africa code africa code oceania code northern 
america
code











list of countries and codes in the Moran’s I graph (continued)
europe code asia code latin amer. & caribbean code
Albania 3 Bahrain 7 Antigua and Barbuda 1
Austria 43 Bangladesh 10 Argentina 5
Belarus 69 Bhutan 24 Bahamas, The 9
Belgium 83 Brunei Darussalam 16 Barbados 8
Bulgaria 15 Cambodia 18 Belize 11
Denmark 35 China 23 Bolivia 12
Finland 44 Cyprus 34 Brazil 14
France 46 India 57 Chile 25
Greece 51 Indonesia 133 Colombia 29
Hungary 55 Israel 58 Costa Rica 30
Iceland 56 Japan 61 Cuba 32
Ireland 39 Jordan 62 Dominican Republic 36
Italy 59 Korea, Rep. 65 Ecuador 37
Luxembourg 84 Kuwait 66 El Salvador 41
Malta 76 Lao PDR 67 Grenada 50
Netherlands 87 Lebanon 68 Guatemala 52
Norway 88 Malaysia 79 Honduras 54
Poland 95 Mongolia 71 Mexico 78
Portugal 97 Nepal 89 Nicaragua 90
Romania 99 Oman 77 Panama 96
Spain 110 Pakistan 94 Paraguay 92
Sweden 112 Philippines 100 Peru 93
Switzerland 113 Saudi Arabia 102 St. Lucia 111
Ukraine 123 Singapore 108 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 127
United 
Kingdom 122 Sri Lanka 19 Trinidad and Tobago 114
Thailand 115 Uruguay 126
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40 Table a1 
Regions and names of countries included in table 1­3 regressions
africa1 africa2 europe asia latin amer. 
& caribbean
oceania
Algeria Mauritius Albania Bahrain Argentina Fiji
Angola Morocco Austria Bangladesh Bahamas Kiribati
Benin Mozambique Belarus Bhutan Barbados New Zealand
Botswana Niger Belgium Brunei Darussalam Belize Samoa
Burkina Faso Nigeria Bulgaria Cambodia Bolivia Tonga
Burundi Rwanda Denmark China Brazil Vanuatu
Cameroon Senegal Finland Cyprus Chile Antigua and Barbuda




Somalia Greece Indonesia Costa Rica
Chad South Africa Hungary Israel Cuba
Comoros Swaziland Iceland Japan Dominican Republic
Congo Togo Ireland Jordan Ecuador
Cote d’Ivoire Tunisia Italy Korea, Republic of El Salvador
Congo,  
Dem. Rep. Uganda Luxembourg Kuwait Grenada
Egypt Tanzania Malta Lao Guatemala
Equatorial 
Guinea Zambia Netherlands Lebanon Honduras
Ethiopia Norway Malaysia Mexico
Gabon Poland Mongolia Nicaragua
Gambia Portugal Nepal Panama
Ghana Romania Oman Paraguay
Guinea Spain Pakistan Peru
Guinea-
Bissau Sweden Philippines Saint Lucia




Lesotho Ukraine Singapore Trinidad and Tobago
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41Table a2 
Regions and names of countries included in table 4­6 regressions





Algeria Mali Austria Bangladesh Argentina Australia Canada
Benin Mauritania Belgium Brunei Darussalam Barbados Fiji
United 
States
Botswana Mauritius Denmark China Bolivia Kiribati
Burkina 




Burundi Niger France India Chile









Chad Seychelles Ireland Israel Cuba












Arab Rep. Swaziland Netherlands Malaysia Guatemala
Gabon Togo Norway Nepal Guyana
Gambia, 
The Tunisia Portugal Oman Honduras
Ghana Zambia Spain Pakistan Mexico
Guinea-
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42 Table a3 
Missing countries from the table 4­6 regressions
africa europe asia latin amer. & 
caribbean
oceania
Comoros Belarus Kuwait Belize Samoa
Cabo Verde Hungary Singapore Antigua and Barbuda Vanuatu
Senegal Switzerland Bahrain St. Lucia Tonga
Equatorial 
Guinea Ukraine Lao PDR Panama New Zealand
Uganda Albania Bhutan Grenada
Ethiopia Romania Lebanon St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Guinea Poland Mongolia Bahamas, The
Angola Bulgaria Cambodia Paraguay
Tanzania Vietnam
Mozambique
Missing countries from the table 1­3 regressions
africa europe asia latin amer. & 
caribbean
oceania
Seychelles Iran, Islamic Rep. Guyana
Papua New 
Guinea
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